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Abstract
This article shows how Pierre Hadot’s idea of philosophy as a way of life
can be applied to Confucian philosophy. Specifically I will show how the
philosophy of the Confucian thinker Mencius has two characteristics
that are indicative of a philosophy that is a way of life. For Hadot, Ancient
Greco-Roman philosophical schools were mainly concerned, not with
philosophical discourse, but with changing their students’ way of living.
Based on Mencius’ own words, it can be inferred that he also believed that
his philosophizing was mainly about transforming people, and that he
treated philosophical discourse as ancillary to this. Furthermore, Hadot
believed that “spiritual exercises” were employed by Ancient GrecoRoman philosophical schools to precisely help transform the lives of
their aspirants. He divides these spiritual exercises into two phases. The
first is “Concentration of the I” where the aspirant ceases to identify with
his conventional and vicious self. This leads to the second phase, namely,
“Expansion of the I” where the aspirant becomes free to identify with the
whole of reality. I suggest that spiritual exercises, or something similar,
can also be seen in Mencius’ teachings. In particular, Mencius’ activity of
“reflection and extension” can be considered a kind of “Concentration
of the I,” whereas his intimation of attaining unity with Heaven and the
world through cultivating qi, can be understood as a kind of “Expansion
of the I.”
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I. Introduction
Pierre Hadot is known for advocating that “philosophy,” as it was
practiced during ancient Greek and Roman times, should be understood mainly as a way of life rather than merely the production of
philosophical discourse. In antiquity, to adopt a philosophy or to
become part of a philosophical school is an “existential option which
demands from the individual a total change of lifestyle, a conversion
of one’s entire being, and ultimately a certain desire to be and live in
a certain way” (Hadot 2002, 3). This process of conversion and the
practices for bringing it about are what Hadot calls “spiritual exercises” (2002, 6). Now Classical Chinese philosophy has also been
considered by scholars as more of a way of life than an academic
activity. For instance, in Fung Yu-Lan’s classic A Short History of Chi
nese Philosophy, it is stated that:
Chinese philosophers were all of them different grades of Socrates.
. . . His [the Chinese Philosopher] philosophy required that he live
it; he himself its vehicle. . . . It was his business to school himself
continually and persistently to that pure experience in which
selfishness and egocentricity were transcended, so that he would be
one with the universe. (Fung 1997, 10)

It is not surprising then that some of these scholars have already
applied Hadot’s ideas in analysing Chinese philosophical writings
(Stalnaker 2006; Møllgaard 2007). Indeed Hadot (2002, 112, 206)
himself more than once cites from the Zhuangzi, a Daoist philosophical text, in describing spiritual exercises. I intend to continue
this dialogue between Hadot and Classical Chinese philosophy by
showing that the philosophy of the Confucian thinker Mencius
broadly resonates with two of Hadot’s ideas about philosophy as a
way of life. These two ideas are (1) the relationship between philo
sophy and philosophical discourse, and (2) spiritual exercises as consisting of the two consecutive steps of “Concentration of the I” and
“Expansion of the I.”
This article will thus proceed as follows: I shall first discuss the
relationship between philosophy and philosophical discourse, as
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articulated in Hadot’s conception of philosophy as a way of life. This
shall be followed by an explanation of spiritual exercises and the two
aforesaid steps of Concentration and Expansion of the I. After this, I
will discuss Mencius’ philosophy and show how it has features that
resonate with Hadot’s ideas. I will also show how, despite fitting into
the conception of philosophy as a way of life, Mencius’ philosophy
still has its own peculiar character compared to the Ancient GrecoRoman philosophies that Hadot discusses. I will then conclude with
a brief consideration on how exploring philosophy as a way of life
can be significant for philosophers in this current time.

II. Philosophy and Philosophical Discourse
Hadot defines philosophical discourse as “‘discursive thought’ ex
pressed in written or oral language” (2002, 4–5). Examples of these
include the systematic articulation of a philosopher’s thought,
and “dialectical” works such as the record of a dialogue or debate
between philosophers. Whatever forms philosophical discourses
might take, Hadot insists that in antiquity these were ultimately at
the service of philosophy as a way of life. Because of the contemporary understanding of philosophy as an academic field concerned
with theoretical issues, there is a temptation to recast ancient philosophy as something similar. As Hadot says:
A profound difference exists between the representations which
the ancients made of philosophia and the representation which is
usually made of philosophy today—at least in the case of the image
of it which is presented to students, because of the exigencies of
university teaching. They get the impression that all the philosophers
they study strove in turn to invent, each in an original way, a new
construction, systematic and abstract, intended somehow or other
to explain the universe. . . . These theories—which one could call
“general philosophy”—give rise, in almost all systems, to doctrines or
criticisms of morality which, as it were, draw the consequences, both
for individuals and for society, of the general principles of the system,
and thus invite people to carry out a specific choice of life and adopt
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a certain mode of behavior. The problem of knowing whether this
choice of life will be efficacious is utterly secondary and accessory; it
doesn’t enter into the perspective of philosophical discourse. (2002, 2)

The current understanding of the “process” of philosophizing is
that a philosopher would first come up with his systematic philo
sophical theory (or discourse). This would then have practical or
ethical corollaries which would help people to live life accordingly.
However, it was not essential to the “philosophy” that this theory
be lived out. In other words, what was considered “philosophy”
was basically the theory or discourse itself. Hadot claims, however,
that this was not the case in ancient philosophy. For him, ancient
philosophy was understood primarily as a way of life that was meant
to bring about a holistic transformation of the person (2002, 3). The
different philosophical schools in antiquity therefore were precisely
embodiments of different ways of living. To be sure, these schools
had their own set of philosophical discourses and these were an
essential part of their philosophizing. Ultimately however, these
discourses were secondary in that they were meant to support the
way of life that a school practiced (2002, 3). Such support can be
in the form of motivating students by justifying this very way of
life. This can be seen for instance in the Stoic school. For the Stoics,
philosophical discourse consists of physics, ethics, and logic (2002,
28). “Physics” describes the place of human beings in the cosmos or
the grand scheme of things. This will have corollaries that pertain
to how human beings should live and relate to each other. Such
corollaries are thus laid out in the “ethics” part of philosophical
discourse. Finally, logic defines the “rules of reasoning” that explain
and validate the previous two parts (2002, 176). All these parts are
meant to be a theoretical justification for the Stoic way of life, which
in turn ultimately serves to give assurance and inspiration for the
aspirant who endeavors to live out that way of life (2002, 175–176).
Philosophical discourse can also serve as instructions or reminders
to these aspirants. An example would be the use of maxims in the
Epicurean School, one of which goes as follows: “The gods are not
to be feared, Death is not to be dreaded; What is good is easy to
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acquire, What is bad is easy to bear” (2002, 123). For Hadot, these
maxims allow easy access to the core doctrines of a philosophical
school because they are concise and are easy to memorize (2002,
123). Through use of these, aspirants can conveniently remind and
galvanize themselves when it comes to living out their philosophy.
Furthermore, the notion that in antiquity living out philosophy
was primary and philosophical discourse secondary was reflected by
how ancient philosophers often criticized those people who were
skilled at the latter but did not pay attention to the former. For
instance, Diogenes Laertius records Polemon, one of the heads of
Plato’s Academy, as saying:
We should exercise ourselves with facts and not with dialectical
speculations; otherwise, like a man who has imbibed some little
handbook on harmony but never practiced, we may be admired for
our ability to pose questions, but will be at variance with ourselves
in the ordering of our lives. (Laertius 2018, 213)

The upshot of this was that philosophical discourses themselves,
especially those Hadot understood as spiritual exercises, were not
expected to be as systematically coherent as their contemporary
counterparts (Hadot 1995, 9, 105). This was particularly important for
Hadot because scholars of ancient philosophical texts like himself
often had a deprecatory view of their object of study since these did
not match up to the systematic rigor of present-day philosophy (1995,
19). A paradigmatic example would be the Meditations of Marcus
Aurelius. The early translators of the Meditations often considered
it as a fragment or a “mutilated” extant of a more organized ethical
work written by the Stoic emperor (1995, 10). This was because
the Meditations, although in some places exhibiting systematic
arguments, was for the most part lacking in cohesion. In Hadot’s
own words, its “sentences seem to follow one another without order,
with the randomness of the impressions and states of soul of the
emperor-philosopher” (1995, 10). Now this would be truly lamentable
if the Meditations was meant to be a systematic treatise. However, as
Hadot says, the principal purpose of philosophical discourse was not
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to systematically relay data but “to produce a certain psychic effect
in the reader,” that is to say, it was meant to produce in the reader
certain attitudes that would support him in living the way of life he
had chosen (1995, 19). The “disjointed” passages in the Meditations
are meant to do just that by being a daily reminder to Aurelius of his
Stoic principles.
Now one philosopher of antiquity that appears to defy Hadot’s
claims is Aristotle. Aristotle’s emphasis on theoretical knowledge, as
well as his numerous systematic theoretical writings, seems to paint
him as someone for whom philosophy is the production of discourse.
Hadot, however, believes that Aristotle’s philosophy can still be under
stood as mainly a transformative way of life, albeit a “theoretical” one
(2002, 80–81). This theoretical life had for its goal the contemplation
(theoria) of the divine and immutable first causes. The activities that
Aristotle’s school engaged in were dedicated to achieving this goal.
Such activities included the methodical study of nature, the enhance
ment of this study through dialectic discussion with colleagues, and
the recording of the fruits of the study (87–88). Now these activities
did not just fill a person with information. Rather, these also inculcated
in aspirants certain attitudes that would make them more conducive
for contemplation. An example would be the attitude of “disinterestedness” or objectivity that resulted from the attempt to study nature
without personal preconceptions, as well as rational discussion with
others. This objectivity in turn allowed the aspirant to detach from his
conventional biases and look at reality in a clearer way (85–86). More
directly, the study of nature made the aspirant conducive to con
templation because by appreciating the beauty of natural things, he
can similarly gain an appreciation of the beauty of the first causes
that produce or move them (83–84). However, in order to be good at
studying nature, and consequently contemplation, it was not enough
that one simply received the information relayed by philosophical
discourse. Rather, one had to experience doing the study. As Aristotle
says:
One might . . . ask why it is that a lad may become a mathematician,
but not a philosopher or natural scientist. Probably it is because the
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former subjects deal with abstractions, whereas the first principles
of the two latter are grasped only as a result of experience; and the
young repeat the doctrines of these without actually believing in
them. (Nicomachean Ethics 1142a12; Aristotle [1961] 2004, 156)

Experience was also necessary, and philosophical discourse insuf
ficient, when it came to the secondary goal of the Aristotelian way of
life, namely, living virtuously (Nicomachean Ethics 1179b4–5; Aristotle
[1961] 2004, 277). As a final point of consideration, philosophical
discourse was also insufficient in being the main purpose of the
Aristotelian way of life because the former was a discursive activity
while contemplation was non-discursive (Hadot 2002, 88).1 Aristotle
believed however that humans could not engage in contemplation
permanently, and thus had to fall back on “lesser” activities such as
what his school practiced. Thus, these lesser activities, including
philosophical discourse, would still be part of the Aristotelian way of
life—although not its most important part.

III. Spiritual Exercises: Concentration and Expansion of the “I”
The above-mentioned examples of short sayings, the Meditations,
and even Aristotelian study, illustrate how philosophical discourse
could serve as “spiritual exercises” for the philosophical aspirant. As
mentioned above, spiritual exercises, or askesis in Ancient Greek, are
those practices that are meant to bring about a transformation in the
aspirant from her original state toward the ideal one posited by her
school. Hadot uses the term “spiritual” to indicate that such exercises are meant to engage and change the whole person’s “psychism”
which arguably means not only the person’s mind but her emotions,
dispositions, and indeed her entire self (1995, 82). “Spiritual” also signifies the final goal of these exercises which, for Hadot, is for one to
be elevated “to the life of the objective Spirit; that is to say, he replaces himself with the perspective of the Whole” (1995, 82). What
1

See Nathan R. Colaner (2015). Colaner shows how in On the Soul I.4 408b18–31,
Aristotle distinguishes between contemplation and discursive thought.
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this apparently means is that through undergoing spiritual exercises,
the philosophical aspirant achieves a kind of unity with the universe
which then allows her to see and value things precisely from the
“point of view” of the cosmos. The activities that fall under spiritual
exercise are many, examples being “research (zetesis), thorough in
vestigation (skepsis), reading (anagnosis), listening (akroasis), attention (prosoche), self-mastery (enkrateia) . . . meditations (meletai),
therapies of the passions, remembrance of good things . . . and the
accomplishment of duties” (Hadot 1995, 84). Despite this variety, the
process of spiritual exercise can be divided into two broad steps. The
first is “Concentration of the I” which eventually leads to the second,
namely, “Expansion of the I.” Let me begin with the first.
Hadot describes the “Concentration of the I” as “the movement
by which the ‘I’ concentrates itself upon itself and discovers that it is
not what it had thought. It ceases to be conflated with the objects to
which it had become attached” (2002, 190). In other words, this
phase is where the aspirant detaches from his conventional, and
often vicious, likes and dislikes. As such “Concentration of the I”
often involved exercises wherein the aspirant denies himself pleasures that he has been habituated to. For instance, Platonic askesis
“consisted of renouncing the pleasures of the flesh and adopting a
specific dietary regime” (190). The Cynic askesis on the other hand
“advocated enduring hunger, cold, and insults, as well as eliminating
all luxury, comfort, and artifices of civilization, in order to cultivate
independence and stamina” (190). Besides these activities that had to
do with the body, askesis also heavily involved the mind. Such mental exercises included the continuous recollection of and meditation
on precisely the principles which remind the aspirant that he should
not attach himself to his base desires. Such principles might be in the
form of a concise maxim as already shown above. It might also be
articulated in a more elaborate way such as Marcus Aurelius’
description of the repulsiveness of the conventional pleasures of
food, clothing, and sex, as seen in his Meditations:
This is the carcass of a fish; this of a bird; and this of a hog. And again
more generally; This phalernum, this excellent highly commended
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wine, is but the bare juice of an ordinary grape. This purple robe, but
sheep’s hairs, dyed with the blood of shellfish. So for coitus, it is but
the attrition of an ordinary base entrail, and the excretion of a little
vile snivel, with a certain kind of convulsion. (Aurelius 1800, 79–80)

The purpose of this graphic depiction is to engage the emotions
and imagination of the aspirant and not just his understanding. In
this way, the aspirant is indeed transformed in a holistic fashion.
As Hadot says (1995, 85): “We must also associate our imagination
and affectivity with the training of our thought. Here, we must bring
into play all the psychagogic techniques and rhetorical methods of
amplification. We must formulate the rule of life to ourselves in the
most striking and concrete way.” When it comes to the Aristotelian
school, the collaborative and dialectic study of nature may also be
understood as askesis in the sense that one is led outside of one’s
own personal biases towards a more objective view of reality.
This more objective or universal view is then what the “Concen
tration of the I” should eventually lead to. That is to say, the “Expansion of the I” is precisely when the self achieves “the perspective of the
whole” mentioned above. Having detached from his conventional
biases and desires, the aspirant now becomes free to grasp the totality
of the universe and his relation to it. This then leads to the sense of
becoming one with the universe or of seeing things from the universal
point of view. Intimations of “Expansion of the I” can be seen from
what Aristotle says in Parts of Animals:
There is a story which tells how some visitors once wished to meet
Heracleitus [sic], and when they entered and saw him in the kitchen,
warming himself at the stove, they hesitated; but Heracleitus said,
“Come in; don’t be afraid; there are gods even here.” In like manner, we
ought not to hesitate nor to be abashed, but boldly to enter upon our
researches concerning animals of every sort and kind, knowing that
in not one of them is Nature or Beauty lacking. (Aristotle 1937, 101)

The context of this passage is that Aristotle is responding to a claim
that the study of animals will involve exploring unattractive things
since some animals appear repulsive to humans. Aristotle’s reply is
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that the student with a truly philosophic spirit will see that beauty is
in all animals because he will realize that even the meanest of them
are nature’s works of art and, ultimately, the effect of the divine first
causes. In other words, because such a student has transcended
his own conventionally human point of view, he will be able to see
things from a universal perspective. And this perspective precisely
shows that the presence and beauty of the divine can be found even
in the seemingly ugliest of animals, just like how Heraclitus saw the
gods in all things (Hadot 2002, 85–86). This universal perspective
is also indicated in the Theaetetus where Socrates describes the
philosopher’s mind as being “borne in all directions . . . ‘both below
the earth,’ and measuring the surface of the earth, and ‘above the
sky,’ studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature of
everything that is, each in its entirety” (Theaetetus 173e–174a; Plato
1921, 121). In the Republic too, Socrates describes the philosophical
person as seeking “integrity and wholeness in all things human and
divine” (Republic 486a; Plato [1935] 1942, 9).
The Stoics and Epicureans also write in like terms. Lucretius (1910,
29) describes Epicurus as one who was able to “burst through the
close-set bolts upon the door of nature,” and to pass “far beyond the
fiery walls of the world, and in mind and spirit traverse . . . the boundless whole.” Lucretius (1910, 107) describes his own philosophical
experience in the same manner, saying, “The terrors of the mind fly
away, the walls of the world part asunder, I see things moving on
through all the void . . . nature is made so clear and manifest, laid bare
to sight on every side.” On the other hand, Marcus Aurelius reminds
himself of this ideal of unity with the universe in his Meditations: “Let
this then be thy first ground, that thou art part of that universe, which
is governed by nature. Then secondly, that to those parts that are of
the same kind and nature as thou art, thou hast relation of kindred”
(Aurelius 1800, 69). Interestingly, a consequence of this unity is
improvement of moral relations towards others. As Aurelius says:
As then I bear in mind that I am a part of such an [sic] universe,
I shall not be displeased with anything that happens. And as I have
relation of kindred to those parts that are of the same kind and
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nature that I am, so I shall be careful to do nothing that is prejudicial
to the community, but in all my deliberations shall they that are of my
kind ever be; and the common good, that, which all my intentions and
resolutions shall drive unto, as that which is contrary unto it, I shall
by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid. (Aurelius 1800, 70)

This squares with Hadot’s understanding that philosophy as a way of
life also aims to perfect our relations with our fellow human beings,
and that this perfection “culminates in love and respect for others”
(2002, 220). Indeed, Hadot even believes that the motivation behind
choosing schools of philosophy is ultimately “the love of mankind”
(220). This “social” motivation also helps give context to the spiritual
exercises themselves in that these are not really done by the philosophical aspirants alone. Rather, these are facilitated to them by their
teachers who in turn see their vocation as including the task of bettering their fellow human beings precisely because of the philosophers’ love of mankind (220).

IV. Mencius’ Philosophy as a Way of Life
1. Philosophical Background
Mencius (372–289 BC) is widely regarded as the philosophical successor of Confucius who both defended and enhanced the latter’s
thought. Perhaps a brief description of Confucius’ philosophy is
appropriate then before continuing. Confucius (551–479 BC) lived
during the “Spring and Autumn” period of Ancient China. This was
an age where the Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BC) was declining in
political power. Real control over China no longer belonged to the
king but to the feudal lords and ministers who gradually usurped
power from him. One way this usurpation manifested was through
their appropriation of ritual activities that were meant only for the
king.2 More seriously however, were the frequent wars that the feudal
would often criticize these acts of appropriation. See Analects 3.1, 3.2, 3.7;
Confucius (2003, 17–18).

2 Confucius
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states waged against each other in hopes of gaining more territory
and power. Many would perish and be reduced to destitution
because of this constant belligerence. In light of this cultural and
moral decay, Confucius proposed his own ethical vision—indeed his
own dao (道) or “Way” of life—that would hopefully rejuvenate society. This vision mainly aimed for development of moral virtues foremost of which was ren (仁), which can be understood as goodness or
benevolence (Confucius 2003, 238). There are in turn two means to
cultivate these virtues. The first is by practicing such virtues in the
family setting. For Confucius, the family is where one first experiences and learns virtuous behavior (Analects 1.1; Confucius 2003, 1).
Thus it is by being consistent in one’s virtuous treatment of one’s
family that one might become a moral being. The second means of
cultivating virtue is by devoting one’s self to the formative elements
of traditional Zhou culture (Slingerland 2009, 117–120). This specifically means reading and reflecting on texts traditionally regarded as
resources for moral education, and by learning proper ritual conduct. Unfortunately, despite his attempts, Confucius was not able to
get himself employed by those in power and thus he could not bring
about his vision. Still his teachings and aspirations lived on in his
disciples and would ultimately be passed on to Mencius.
Mencius however, who lived more than a century after Confu
cius, faced a quite different challenge than that of the latter. Aside
from the chaos still being brought about by the Zhou’s decline, Mencius also had to contend with other schools of philosophy which had
developed after Confucius’ death (Mencius 3B9.9–9.10; Mencius
2008, 85). These schools questioned the legitimacy of the Confucian
Way in many respects. For the sake of brevity, let me cite only one of
their most pressing criticisms, namely, the necessity of Confucian rituals for human flourishing. One school of philosophy, Mohism, criticized Confucian rituals as a waste of resources and manpower. For
instance, Confucius promoted the traditional observance of a threeyear mourning period after the death of one’s parents (Analects 17.21;
Confucius 2003, 209–210). For Confucius this was the ritually appropriate display of the virtue of filial piety. The Mohists however argued
that such a practice leads to incredible unproductivity and that it is
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ultimately detrimental to the well-being of the community (Fraser
2009, 149). Another school of philosophy, Yangism, indirectly put into
question Confucian rituals through its theory that humans are naturally egoistic (Mencius 7A26; Mencius 2008, 178). For the Yangists,
what is most natural for a human being is to preserve his own body.
As such, other-regarding attitudes, like the Confucian virtues, should
be shunned. This of course entailed that the entire Confucian program of moral development, including performance of traditional
rituals, are “unnatural” and thus should not be carried out.
It was in the face of these threats that Mencius articulated the
philosophical idea he is most famous for, namely, that human nature
is good (Mencius 6A6; Mencius 2008, 149–150). By this he meant
that, contrary to the Yangists, humans have in their hearts natural
other- regarding feelings such as compassion and respect. These
feelings, along with human nature itself, are given to man by Heaven,
the supreme cosmic and normative power which Mencius sometimes equated with the world (Mencius 2B1; Mencius 2008, 50). To
show that humans have these other-regarding feelings naturally,
Mencius posed his famous thought experiment of a child about
to fall in a well (Mencius 2A6.3; Mencius 2008, 46). For Mencius,
anyone who sees such a child would surely feel a sense of alarm
and compassion. And these feelings would not be prompted by cal
culated, self-serving motives such as wanting praise for saving the
child or annoyance at the child’s cries should he fall. Rather, the feelings would be spontaneous and would intend the child’s well-being
itself. It was this idea of human nature’s goodness that Mencius
utilized to defend the Confucian Way. For him, the other-regarding
feelings, although indicating the goodness of human nature, were
not yet its full actualization. He compared these feelings to sprouts
that needed further cultivation in order to “grow” into moral virtues
such as benevolence (Mencius 2A6.5–6.7; Mencius 2008, 46–47). And
the means to cultivate them was precisely the Confucian Way. So for
example, all human beings have indeed the natural feeling of compassion. However, because it is just a feeling it can be inconsistent
and the person experiencing the feeling might also not be able to
express it in the proper manner. The Confucian Way then could help
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develop these feelings into virtues by galvanizing a person to habitually engage in compassionate or caring acts, beginning with those
whom he already cares for, such as his family. Through this, the feeling of compassion will mature into the primary Confucian virtue of
benevolence. Moreover, by educating a person in traditional ritual
forms, Confucianism provides the proper, culturally-approved manner in which one could express these feelings. It was in this way then
that Mencius defended Confucian rituals, that is to say, these served
as a means to develop and express the moral capacities of human
nature. Thus they were worth investing and participating in, despite
the high material cost they might entail.
2. Philosophical Discourse in Mencius
Let me now proceed to how Mencius’ philosophy appears to fit
with Hadot’s conception of philosophy as a way of life. As men
tioned above, one of the characteristics of Ancient Greco-Roman
philosophy which indicates that it is a way of life, is that it aims
primarily at transforming a person and only secondarily at philo
sophical discourse. Does Mencius’ philosophizing have a similar
characteristic? I believe so, and this can be seen in what Steven Geisz
(2008, 191–194) considers to be Mencius’ “strategic-pragmatic” view of
language. For Geisz, this means that Mencius’ use of language “treats
truth and descriptive adequacy as secondary to the shaping of his
audience’s behavior by any means available—so long as these means
are consistent with the overall Confucian dao he is promoting” (2008,
192). Geisz’ hypothesis stems from two bases. One is the opinion of
certain contemporary scholars that Classical Chinese philosophy
“held a conception of language that saw it as having an overriding
function of regulating behavior” (Geisz 2008, 191). This is a corollary
of another commonly agreed characteristic of Classical Chinese
philosophy, namely, its emphasis on the practical/ethical (Slingerland
2003, 3). The second and more significant basis is Mencius’ own
words. There are several instances where what Mencius says hints or
indicates that his view of language is indeed strategic-pragmatic. One
example is his awareness of his own task. When it was made known
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to him that he was considered as someone “fond of [philosophical]
disputation,” Mencius passionately replies:
How can I be fond of disputation? I simply cannot do otherwise.
. . . If the Ways of Yang Zhu and Mozi [the founders of Yangism
and Mohism respectively] do not cease, and the Way of Kongzi
[Confucius] is not made evident, then evil doctrines will dupe the
people and obstruct benevolence and righteousness. . . . Because I
fear this, I preserve the Way of the former sages, fend off Yang Zhu
and Mozi, and get rid of specious words, so that evil doctrines will
be unable to arise. If they arise in one’s heart, they are harmful in
one’s activities. If they arise in one’s activities, they are harmful in
governing. . . . How could I be fond of disputation? I simply cannot
do otherwise.3 (Mencius 3B9.1–9.14; Mencius 2008, 83–86)

Here Mencius explicitly says that his main goal is to promote the
Confucian Way and that this is the reason why he engages in debate
with the other philosophical schools. In other words, what is most
important for him is the way people live and how such ways-of-life
might be transformed, for better or for worse. Philosophical discourse was contingent on this primary goal and was not meant to be
engaged in for its own sake.
Perhaps a more explicit indication of Mencius’ use of strategicpragmatic language is when he talks about how the morally accomplished person or “gentleman” should speak (Geisz 2008, 199–201).
Mencius says:
The mouth in relation to flavors, the eyes in relation to sights, the
ears in relation to notes, the nose in relation to odors, the four limbs
in relation to comfort—these are matters of human nature, but they
are also fated. Nonetheless, a gentleman does not refer to them as
“human nature.” Benevolence between father and son, righteousness
between ruler and minister, propriety between guest and host . . .
these are fated, but they also involve human nature. Nonetheless, a

3 予豈好辯哉? 予不得已也 . . . 楊墨之道不息, 孔子之道不著, 是邪說誣民, 充塞仁義也 . . . 吾為此懼, 閑先聖之

道，距楊墨, 放淫辭, 邪說者不得作. 作於其心, 害於其事; 作於其事, 害於其政 . . . 豈好辯哉? 予不得已也.
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gentleman does not refer to them as “fated.”4 (Mencius 7B24.1–4.2;
Mencius 2008, 189)

To understand this passage, a closer look at the concepts of “nature
(xing 性)” and “fate (ming 命)” is needed. Mencius’ idea of nature can
already be gleaned from what he says above about the other-regarding feelings of human beings since these feelings are merely his
more specific description of human nature. Again, these feelings are
inherent in human beings but can be further developed into virtues
through participation in the Confucian Way. Thus nature for Mencius can be understood as something inherent that can be further
cultivated or perfected through human agency. As for fate, Mencius
has this to say: “When no one extends to it, yet it is reached—this is
fate”5 (Mencius 5A6.2; Mencius 2008, 125). This means that fate is
something that is achieved even without the intervention of human
agency, that is to say, it is something inevitable. In the above passage,
what Mencius seems to be saying is that both a human being’s sensuous and moral inclinations are natural (meaning they are inherent
but can be further cultivated) and are fated (meaning they will in
evitably arise at one point). However, in order to urge people to live
according to the Confucian Way, it is not sensuous inclinations that
should be cultivated but moral ones. Therefore, the gentleman should
not speak of moral inclinations as if they are fated and require no
effort to bring about. Conversely, he should not call sensuous inclinations natural, lest the idea arise that these inclinations should be
the ones to be cultivated.6 This meaning of the passage then suggests
two things about Mencius. First is that he is consciously painting an
inaccurate picture of human nature whenever he talks about it as
being good by virtue of possessing the four sprouts. This is because
he knows that humans also have non-moral feelings or inclinations
that are just as natural. The second is that the reason behind this
inaccurate portrayal is his belief that motivating people to follow the
4 口之於味也, 目之於色也, 耳之於聲也, 鼻之於臭也, 四肢之於安佚也, 性也, 有命焉, 君子不謂性也. 仁之於父子也,

義之於君臣也, 禮之於賓主也, 智之於賢者也, 聖人之於天道也, 命也, 有性焉, 君子不謂命也.

5 莫之致而至者, 命也.

6 See also Geisz (2008, 199–200) and Mencius (2008, 189–190).

The Philosophy of Mencius as a Way of Life  59  

Confucian way is more important than giving a faithful philosophical anthropology. In other words, for Mencius, living out a philosophy
is primary while philosophical discourse is secondary.
One last area where Mencius’ strategic-pragmatic use of language can be inferred is from his very manner of debating with rival
philosophers. An example would be Mencius’ disputation with Gaozi
(Mencius 6A1.1–4.5; Mencius 2008, 143–147). This debate is especially
significant because this is where Mencius’ theory of the goodness of
human nature appears prominently. However, modern scholars
have expressed their disappointment in how this most distinctive
idea of Mencian philosophy should be defended by the philosopher
himself in such a dismal way (Hansen 1992, 154; Waley 1939, 68).
Indeed, just as Ancient Greco-Roman philosophy might be criticized
by contemporary thinkers for lack of being systematic and logically
consistent, current scholars of Chinese thought have also criticized
Mencius for his apparently incompetent argumentation. For one
thing, both Mencius and Gaozi in talking about human nature mostly
use analogies. According to Arthur Waley, however, such analogies
are irrelevant, “most of which can be used to disprove what they are
intended to prove” (1939, 68). Human nature is, for instance, compared to water. For Gaozi, human nature is ethically neutral and
can be made either good or bad depending on external influence.
This is like water which has no inherent direction but can be made
to flow either right or left depending on the path that is carved for it.
However, Mencius’ response is that water has an inherent direction,
namely downwards, and that human nature’s tendency towards goodness is like this downward tendency. Although Mencius might score
points at being witty enough to use his opponent’s metaphor to his
own advantage, ultimately the response obviously does not “prove”
that human nature is good since it is all based on (irrelevant) analogy.
For Geisz though, Mencius might not have really been aiming at
giving a robust argument for the goodness of human nature. Rather,
he might simply have wanted his audience to consider and be inspired
by the idea that human nature is good—and indeed his audience will
likely be led to do so since Mencius appears as the “winner” of the
debate (Geisz 2008, 208). Something similar can apply to the aforesaid
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thought experiment on the child falling into a well. As Geisz states,
although Mencius says that everyone would naturally experience the
feeling of compassion and alarm upon seeing the child, he does not
actually give reasons to support that claim (2008, 209–210). In other
words, Mencius merely asserts that all humans are naturally compassionate without arguing for it. Again it might be inferred that what
Mencius really intended is for people to simply consider the idea and
be galvanized by it. Indeed, perhaps Mencius intended the thought
experiment to serve a similar purpose to that of the Stoic maxims,
namely, a way for aspirants to be reminded of the goal of their philo
sophy, which in the case of Confucianism is living compassionately
and benevolently.
3. Spiritual Exercise in Mencius
As mentioned above, spiritual exercises are the means to attain the
ideal state posited by the philosophical schools, and these exercises
can be divided into the two phases of Concentration and Expansion
of the I. Mencius also has his “means” for one to be transformed
more into the Confucian ideal. Specifically, Mencius proposes a
practice that might be called “reflection and extension” in order to
develop the natural moral potential of the human being. I believe
that this practice resonates with the “Concentration of the I” that
Hadot speaks of as the first phase of spiritual exercises. On the
other hand, Mencius also speaks of how the effect of this reflection
and extension (and practicing the Confucian Way in general) leads
to a state of greater unity with the universe. I believe this parallels
Hadot’s “Expansion of the I.” Let me begin first with “reflection
and extension.” Perhaps one of the clearest instances where this
practice can be seen is the story of Mencius’ dialogue with King Xuan
concerning an ox (Mencius 1A7.3–7.13; Mencius 2008, 7–11). I will
start with that part of the story which portrays “reflection.” Mencius
meets King Xuan and the latter asks whether he has what it takes
to become caring towards his people and in that way become a
true king. The king asks this because he does not himself believe he
can become this kind of person, considering that he has many self-
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serving vices such as fondness for belligerence, sexual pleasure, and
material wealth. Mencius, however, believes that the king indeed
has what it takes to become a caring person. The king asks how,
and Mencius replies by telling him about an incident that he has
heard wherein the king supposedly spared an ox about to be ritually
sacrificed, and instead substituted it for a lamb. Mencius asks if this
incident is true and the king answers in the affirmative. Mencius
then replies that this is proof that the king’s heart has what it takes
to become caring since this shows that it, as with the hearts of all
human beings, has the natural feeling of compassion. Mencius also
says that that the explanation given by other people for the king
sparing the ox—namely that the king did it out of stinginess—is false.
This makes the king realize that he himself did not know why he
spared the ox. This, in turn, prompts him to recall and re-examine
the incident so that he could know what indeed his motivation was.
After a moment of introspection, he agrees with Mencius that indeed
he spared the ox out of compassion. He then praises Mencius for
helping him understand his heart.
In this dialogue, Mencius leads King Xuan to precisely “reflect” on
an instance where he showed compassion. This entails remembering
the instance but also examining it in such a way that the one who
reflects might attain some moral insight about it which he did not
have previously. In fact, the insight that the king gains is that he is not
someone whose feelings and desires only correspond to base pleasures like sensuality and wealth. Rather, he also has the “heart” or
moral feeling of compassion (Slingerland 2003, 142). This fits with
Hadot’s description of “Concentration of the I” which again is “the
movement by which the ‘I’ concentrates itself upon itself and dis
covers that it is not what it had thought” (2002, 190). Moreover, the
king has also arguably realized that this feeling of compassion is
most natural to him. This is because, through reflecting, the king realizes that his feeling of compassion was so spontaneous that he did
not even know that such a feeling was the motive behind his sparing
of the ox (Slingerland 2003, 143). In other words, he discovers that his
feeling of compassion is something inherent or natural. This can then
galvanize the king to develop this natural moral feeling and also
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inspire him to distance himself from his immoral inclinations, since
now he has become aware that there is more to his nature than these
inclinations. This, again, fits with Hadot’s description of “Concentration of the I,” where the self “ceases to be conflated with the objects to
which it had become attached” (2002, 190).
The dialogue however is not yet done. The question remains as to
how the king can develop this natural moral feeling. This is where
the notion of “extension” comes in. After praising Mencius for helping him discover his heart, King Xuan then asks how this would
suffice to become a true king who cares for his subjects. Mencius,
who by now seems to be a philosophical mentor facilitating askesis
to his student, replies by giving analogies. He compares the king’s
ability to show compassion to an ox but not his people, to someone
who claims to be able to lift 500 pounds but not a feather, and also
to someone who claims to see the tip of an autumn hair but not a
wagon of firewood. Mencius then claims that in all these cases the
failure to do something stems not from lack of ability but from
unwillingness. The king then asks how one can distinguish from
these two. Mencius replies by saying that tucking Mount Tai under
one’s arm and leaping over the North Sea is something one is truly
unable to do. However, collecting kindling for an elderly person is
something one is able to do and thus one who claims to be unable to
do it is really just unwilling. Mencius then says that the king’s un
willingness to be caring to his people is analogous to this latter case.
Here we see that Mencius employs both logical reasoning and ex
aggerated imagery (carrying a mountain, jumping over the sea) to
convince the king that he is indeed capable of exercising compassion to his people and thus become a true king. This can be related to
what Hadot (1995, 85) mentioned above on how spiritual exercises
should use “all the psychagogic techniques and rhetorical methods
of amplification” in effecting transformation. Finally Mencius says:
Treat your elders as elders, and extend it to the elders of others; treat
your young ones as young ones, and extend it to the young ones of
others, and you can turn the world in the palm of your hand. The
Odes say, “He set an example for his little woman, It extended to
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his brothers, and so he controlled his clan and state.” This means
that he simply took this feeling and applied it to that. Hence, if one
extends one’s kindness, it will be sufficient to care for all within the
Four Seas. If one does not extend one’s kindness, one will lack the
wherewithal to care for ones’ wife and children. That in which the
ancients greatly exceeded others was no other than this. They were
simply good at extending what they did. In the present case your
kindness is sufficient to reach animals, but the effects do not reach
the commoners. Why is this case alone different?7 (Mencius 1A7.12;
Mencius 2008, 11)

Here we see Mencius suggests a way of proceeding in which the king
can more easily cultivate his care for others. This is by using his care
for those whom he already loves (or finds easy to love) as an analogy
for caring for others. Indeed, this is arguably what Mencius has been
doing all along in making the king reflect on the ox incident. In other
words, Mencius wants the king to reflect on those instances where
he felt care, and through this reflection, galvanize himself (cognitively
and affectively) into, precisely, extending this care to those whom he
has not yet learned to care for. Through this method, one can habi
tuate oneself in virtue and thus becomes less identified with one’s
previous conventional (and vicious) state. This, again, can be considered as part of “Concentration of the I.”
There is also an element in Mencius’ philosophy that corresponds to the “Expansion of the I.” Again, this expansion is the outcome of living out the practices included in the “Concentration of
the I,” and it entails gaining a sense of unity with the universe. For
Mencius, unity with the universe or Heaven seems to be the ultimate
outcome of understanding and exercising the moral nature of the
heart. This is hinted when he says that the gentleman or morally
accomplished person “flows with Heaven above and Earth below”8
(Mencius 7A13.3; Mencius 2008, 174). Now the reason for this is that,
7 老吾老, 以及人之老; 幼吾幼, 以及人之幼. 天下可運於掌.《詩》云:『刑于寡妻, 至于兄弟, 以御于家邦.』言舉

斯心加諸彼而已. 故推恩足以保四海, 不推恩無以保妻子. 古之人所以大過人者無他焉, 善推其所為而已矣. 今
恩足以及禽獸, 而功不至於百姓者, 獨何與?

8 上下與天地同流.
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as said above, human nature and its moral feelings are given by
Heaven. Thus by cultivating this nature one aligns with Heaven’s will
and by extension the way of the universe. Mencius more explicitly
states this when he says:
To fully fathom one’s heart is to understand nature. To understand
one’s nature is to understand Heaven. To preserve one’s heart and
nourish one’s nature is the way to serve Heaven. To not become
conflicted over the length of one’s life but to cultivate oneself and
await one’s fate is the way to take one’s stand on fate.9 (Mencius
7A1.1–1.3; Mencius 2008, 171)

Here Mencius portrays that a person’s ideal state is in thoroughly
understanding and activating his nature, which simultaneously
means being cognitively and volitionally united with Heaven, the
force that guides the universe. Since one is united with that which
guides everything, one need not worry even about death.
Perhaps Mencius’ most elaborate statement that implies “Expansion of the I” is when he discusses his “floodlike qi” to his disciple
Gongsun Chou. It is best to cite the entire dialogue:
Gongsun Chou next asked, “May I ask wherein you excel, Master?”
Mencius replied, “I understand doctrines. I am good at cultivating
my floodlike qi. Gongsun Chou continued, “May I ask what is meant
by ‘floodlike qi?’ Mencius replied, “It is difficult to explain. It is a qi
that is supremely great and supremely unyielding. If one cultivates
it with uprightness and does not harm it, it will fill up the space
between Heaven and Earth. . . . It is produced by accumulated
righteousness. It cannot be obtained by a seizure of righteousness.
If some of one’s actions leave one’s heart unsatisfied, it will starve.10
(Mencius 2A11–14; Mencius 2008, 38–39)

What Mencius means has been the subject of much discussion among
interpreters. The concept of “qi” itself might prove difficult to under9 盡其心者, 知其性也. 知其性, 則知天矣. 存其心, 養其性, 所以事天也. 殀壽不貳, 修身以俟之, 所以立命也.

10 敢問夫子惡乎長? 曰:我知言, 我善養吾浩然之氣. 敢問何謂浩然之氣? 曰:難言也. 其為氣也, 至大至剛, 以直養

而無害, 則塞于天地之閒 . . . 是集義所生者, 非義襲而取之也. 行有不慊於心, 則餒矣.
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stand for those outside of East Asian culture. Among English translations it has been described variously as “ether,” “material force,”
and “psychophysical stuff” (Mencius 2008, xxxviii). Indeed qi has
been understood differently by Chinese philosophers themselves
depending on the time in which they lived. According to Bryan Van
Norden, at least in Mencius’ era, qi was understood as “a kind of fluid,
found in the atmosphere and in the human body, closely connected to
the kind and intensity of one’s emotional reaction” (Mencius 2008,
xxxviii). Perhaps a simple way of understanding qi is to consider it the
equivalent of “air” in the common saying “There is tension in the air.”
This example indicates the reciprocal relationship between qi and
emotion. Similar to how a tense air can both be caused by and cause,
strong emotions, qi is also something that is produced and produces
emotion (Mencius 2008, xxxviii–xxxix). In Mencius’ quote above, he
implies that the “floodlike qi” is produced by the satisfaction that
comes with doing righteous deeds. Eventually, if further cultivated,
this qi would permeate all the world. This can be understood to mean
that living out the Confucian Way, through cultivation of the nascent
moral feeling by way of “reflection and extension,” would ultimately
lead to a feeling of oneness with the universe. This process must be
continuous and the Confucian aspirant must be unflagging in living a
righteous life according to his philosophy. Still the reward in the end
appears worth the undertaking since one will be able to experience a
supreme, mystical, kind of joy in being united to all. This can be seen
when Mencius says, “All the 10,000 things are there in me. There is no
greater joy than to find, on self-examination, that I am true to myself”11
(Mencius 7A4.1; Mencius 2003, 146).

V. Mencius’ Distinctiveness
Despite fitting into Hadot’s conception of philosophy as a way of
life, there are still features of Mencius’ philosophy that distinguishes
it from its Ancient Greco-Roman counterparts. One such feature is
11 萬物皆備於我矣. 反身而誠, 樂莫大焉.
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its “other-orientedness.” By “other-orientedness,” I simply mean that
Mencius’ philosophy chiefly aims to lead people towards enhancing
the well-being of others. This can be seen in the highest value of the
Mencian Way, namely, ren or benevolence, which in turn is a virtue of
being good to others. This is unlike some schools of Ancient GrecoRoman philosophy which tend to ultimately aim at individual wellbeing, like personal tranquility (Long [1974] 1986, 4).12 This difference
has implications for the spiritual exercises of these philosophies
and how they are understood. For instance, Stoic askesis includes
detachment from material pleasure as could be seen in the above
example of Aurelius’ Meditations. This is in the service of attaining
the goal in Stoicism which is the aforesaid tranquillity. In other words,
the Stoic must detach himself from external goods so that he will be
unperturbed by their possible loss and therefore have indestructible
inner tranquility (Aurelius 2007, 130). On the other hand, Mencius
also speaks about reducing desires for material pleasure. However
this is not because it ultimately impedes one’s personal tranquility but
because excessively entertaining these desires distracts a person from
cultivating oneself to be benevolent (Mencius 6A14–15.2; Mencius
2008, 155–156). Mencius would on occasion even encourage people
to enjoy material goods as long as they share these with the lessfortunate (Mencius 1A2.1–2.3; Mencius 2008, 2–3).
Another differentiating feature between Mencius and some An
cient Greco-Roman philosophies would be the kind of knowledge
that they ultimately strove for. For some schools in antiquity, the
knowledge that is most sought for is that of immaterial, immutable,
universal entities, such as the forms in the case of Platonism. On the
12

This does not necessarily contradict Hadot’s claim above that philosophers were
motivated by “love of mankind” because the goal of a philosophy can be distinct from
what motivates a person to pursue it. For instance, although Stoicism may have as a
goal one’s individual tranquility, the Stoic aspirant might pursue Stoicism so that he
can teach others how to attain this tranquility, out of love for them. This also need
not go against Hadot’s other claim that living out Ancient Greco-Roman philosophies
“culminates in love and respect for others” because this can be an effect of the
philosophy’s main goal. For example, attaining Stoic tranquility might lead to a more
enhanced love of neighbor because one is free from needless anxieties that hamper
one’s care for others.
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other hand, followers of Mencius would have likely prized a sort
of empathic practical wisdom that allowed them to respond with
proper benevolence in a given situation. Again, this difference shows
in the spiritual exercises of the respective philosophies. In the Phae
do, Socrates talks about what is arguably a spiritual exercise, namely,
“purification.” He says:
The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy . . .
encourages it gently and tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes
and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to
withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable,
and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to
trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract
existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees
by other means . . . since everything of that kind is visible and ap
prehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is
invisible. . . . Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it
must not resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from
pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears. (Phaedo 82d–83b; Plato
[1914] 2005, 289)

Here it can be inferred that purification is an activity where the aspirant attempts to bar from his consciousness all sensory data in order
to focus more on non-sensory objects or concepts. He also detaches
himself from any dispositions related to sensory objects so that he is
indifferent from the “lusts and griefs and fears” that these objects
might cause him. The purpose of this purification is to allow the soul
to ultimately behold the non-sensory essences or forms of things. In
contrast to Platonic purification, the Mencian exercise of “reflection”
very much utilizes sensory data in the act of reflective remembering.
King Xuan in recollecting the scene where he showed compassion to
the ox would of course recount the scene’s sensory properties. Also,
in contrast to the Platonic aspirant who detaches not only from the
sensory data but also from the dispositions or emotions associated
with it, King Xuan would likely rekindle the feeling of compassion
that he felt during that scene because the emotion is triggered by the
scene and is part of it. Furthermore, unlike purification, the practice
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of reflection aims to build in King Xuan the ability, not to see immaterial essences, but to respond to future cases that require compassion
since by repeatedly remembering one scenario where he showed
compassion, he might realize how other scenarios are similar to it.13
Thus the exercise of reflection ultimately contributes to the abovementioned empathic practical wisdom valued by the Mencian Way.
Related to this, another difference between Mencius’ philosophy
and that of its more theoretical Greco-Roman counterparts is that,
for the latter, one way of “Expanding the I” is through scientific study
of the universe. By doing this the philosopher is led to transcend the
smallness of his humanity and enlarge himself by seeing things from
the universal point of view. The abovementioned description of the
philosopher in the Theaetetus, as well as Aristotle’s account of the
study of animals, already implies this. Another example is the Stoic
Seneca’s defence of physics. He says:
“[The philosopher’s mind] watches the rising and the setting of the
stars, and their differing and harmonious paths; it observes where
each star first reveals its light to earth, where its zenith . . . is, to what
point it descends. . . . To look into all this, to learn about it, to brood
over it—is this not to transcend one’s mortality and be registered
with a higher status? ‘What use will that be to you?’ you say. If
nothing else, at least this: I shall know that everything is puny when
I have measured god.” (Seneca 2010, 138–139)

In contrast, studying the cosmos as means to expand one’s self seems
to be absent from Mencius’ thought. For him, it is by accumulating
righteous deeds that one’s qi expands to fill the world. Again, Mencius
is not precise in describing this process but if a little speculation is
allowed, this is how I think it goes: As the Mencian aspirant becomes
more successful in following Heaven by practicing virtue, he becomes
more familiar or attuned precisely to the ways of Heaven. However,
since Heaven’s order permeates the world, then this leads also to a
familiarity with the world itself. To use an analogy, and one that is

13

See Ivanhoe (2002, 221–236).
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inspired by Mencius,14 imagine a person who has just been newly
introduced to a dance. This person will initially feel unfamiliar and
even alienated from the dance and his fellow dancers. But as he practices the dance more, his familiarity with it increases. This sense of
familiarity then gives him a feeling of confidence and of being “at
home” with the dance and his fellow dancers. This feeling in turn
encourages him towards further mastering the dance. Eventually, he
might achieve such a high appreciation and mastery of it, that whenever he dances, he no longer experiences any incongruence between
his self on the one hand, and his fellow dancers and the dance itself on
the other. In a manner of speaking, he has become “one” with them.
This, in turn, might be similar to experience of the Mencian aspirant.
The more he follows the ways of Heaven, the more he attains a familiarity with it and all things. This feeling of familiarity then produces
the “air” or qi of being at home with the cosmos. Nonetheless, this air
is not just a product of the feeling of familiarity. Rather, it also pro
duces such a feeling, which in turn encourages the aspirant to further
alignment with the ways of Heaven. This process ultimately culminates in the experience of being one with all things. In summary,
the Mencian “Expansion of the I” is distinct from its Ancient GrecoRoman counterparts because it is not brought about by attaining
scientific knowledge of the universe. Rather, it seems to be the fruit of
a practical and affective knowledge which might be the product, not
just of being habituated in the normative ways of Heaven, but of actually enjoying such ways.

VI. Conclusion
In this article I have discussed how Mencius’ philosophy can be
considered a way of life according to Pierre Hadot’s conception.
That is to say, Mencius’ philosophy can be understood as a manner
14

Mencius 4A27; Mencius (2008, 101). Mencius says: “If one delights in them [i.e., the
virtues], then they grow. If they grow, then how can they be stopped? If they cannot be
stopped, then one does not notice one’s feet dancing to them, one’s hands swaying to
them.” 樂則生矣; 生則惡可已也, 惡可已, 則不知足之蹈之、手之舞之.
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of living that can holistically transform a person toward achieving
unity with reality, or at the least, one’s fellow human beings. Due to
humanity’s current predicament, where more than ever people have
become polarized along racial, social, and cultural lines, perhaps it is
high time for something like Mencius’ philosophy to be practiced as
a way of life. At the least, perhaps some version of Mencian spiritual
exercise, where one is cultivated to become more empathic toward
others, might be conceptualized and made into a practice. And
perhaps it is not only the Mencian way of life that requires reviving.
The other ancient schools of philosophy can also provide guidance
and comfort in these challenging times. After all, in these days
where the prospect of returning to a normal way of life has become
tenuous due to the pandemic, it seems that people could use Stoic
tranquility to ease their anxieties and give them focus. To be sure,
contemporary religions might also be able to provide what these
philosophies purport to. Yet it is also true that not all people today
have religious faith so that ancient philosophies might indeed still
fill a need. But who will revive these ways of life from the dustbin
of history? I believe that the most appropriate ones to do it are
precisely those who are likely to have knowledge of them, that is
to say, the philosophers. In other words, perhaps it is apropos for
present-day philosophers to now return to what could likely have
been the original meaning of their vocation.
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